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Constitution of the United States
preamble
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
of America.

fourteenth amendment
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for
the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the
members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or
in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the
number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
vii
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United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support
the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the
loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall
be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.

article iv
Section 2, Clause 1. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
Section 2, Clause 2. A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other
Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on
Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered
up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
Section 2, Clause 3. No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the
Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered
up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
Section 3, Clause 2. The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed
as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.
Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and
on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.
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Introduction
Elizabeth Reilly, The University of Akron School of Law

We must accept finite disappointment, but we must never lose infinite hope.
—Martin Luther King, Jr.

T

he 14th Amendment embodies hope. An outgrowth of the Civil War and
its aftermath, the Amendment profoundly reconstituted “the People of
the United States” and redefined what it meant “to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility . . . promote the general
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty.”1
The importance of the 14th Amendment is hard to overestimate; some have
called its adoption the “second founding.” The Amendment has a wide scope
and is one of the most frequently invoked sources of protection for individual
liberties.2
Among the many reasons to enshrine the 14th Amendment in a position of
Constitutional primacy is the fact that the Amendment was designed to have,
and has had, profound effects upon all three of the structural principles undergirding the Constitution: federalism, individual rights, and separation of
powers. As the 39th Congress struggled with correcting the wrongs that had
divided the Union before, during and after the Civil War, altering the constitutional understanding of each of these principles was essential. The vast reach
of this enterprise was not lost on the Amendment’s framers or on the American
people.
From its stunning opening phrases through to its final section on congressional power, the Amendment recast national and state power and the individ1
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ual’s place within the governing structure. After decreeing that “All persons born
or naturalized . . . are citizens of the United States,” Section 1 limited state power
to infringe individual rights—“No State shall make or enforce any law” to
“abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens,” or to “deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law” or to “deny to any person”
the “equal protection of the laws.” To emphasize the national power to protect
those rights, Section 5 explicitly granted Congress the power to enforce all of the
provisions of the Amendment. The 14th Amendment left no doubt that the
powers reserved to the states were altered and that the powers granted to the
national government were expanded.
The Amendment also tackled significant questions of the terms of reunification. Section 2 directly reduced apportioned representation in any state that
denied a male citizen of age the right to vote in a federal or state election. This
section negated the excess allocation of representatives to slave states that had
been accomplished through the infamous Three-Fifths Clause, and counted
freedpeople only if they were also granted the right to vote. Section 3 disqualified from federal or state office all of those who betrayed their previous oaths of
office by engaging in insurrection against the United States and granted the pardoning power over this disability to the Congress, not the President. Together,
Sections 2 and 3 prevented the antebellum Slave Power structure from reasserting itself in the readmitted states and in the branches of the federal government.
Section 4 prohibited the nation or any state from assuming or paying any debt
incurred in aid of insurrection, prevented claims for compensation based upon
emancipation of the slaves and validated national debt incurred in preserving
the Union. Thus, Section 5 both placed Congress in charge of the reconstruction,
and expanded its role in the constitutional system of government.
Despite its high purpose and its structural changes to the constitutional
framework, the 14th Amendment was not universally embraced. The United States
Supreme Court promptly eviscerated much of the meaning of Section 1’s guarantees of citizenship, privileges and immunities, due process, and equal protection.
In short order, the Court also limited Congress’s power to enforce rights and narrowed the federal power to protecting the rights in the Amendment only from state
action, not the actions of private parties like the Ku Klux Klan. By 1883, the
Supreme Court’s interpretations appeared to render the Amendment all but impotent.3 The precedental impact of that legacy continues to haunt constitutional law.
The Amendment regained some of its power when the twentieth-century
Court began using the Due Process Clause to incorporate guarantees of the Bill
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of Rights and make them applicable to the states. Congress resurrected the
Amendment as a source of the equal protection principle during the Civil Rights
era of the 1960s, using the Commerce Power to support its legislation. The
Supreme Court upheld those statutes, and began to articulate an interpretation
of Section 5 (and its companion Section 2 of the 15th Amendment) that accorded
Congress the power to guarantee rights through far-reaching legislation.4 But
citizen activism kept the spirit and promise of the Amendment alive during the
intervening century.
This book grew out of a symposium held in October 2009 at the University
of Akron School of Law celebrating the 140th anniversary of the ratification of
the 14th Amendment. Anniversaries provide fruitful occasions to reflect. The
book seizes upon that opportunity to ask a central interpretive question: How
did the First Interpreters of the 14th Amendment interpret and use the Amendment and thereby affect its meaning?
In addressing this question, several subsidiary questions become important.
First, how did the framers and adopters of the Amendment, the 39th Congress,
interpret their work? Second, how did the Supreme Court initially interpret the
Amendment, and how did their interpretation affect future cases and readings?
Third, how did the American people interpret and use the Amendment? The
chapters in this book examine different aspects of these questions, explicating
the initial interpretations by the Congress, the United States Supreme Court and
the public, and examining their lasting impacts.
The 39th Congress labored on the Amendment from December 1865 until
June 1866. Ratification occurred during and after the critical 1866 elections, which
functioned as a referendum on the Amendment and clarified the strength of
public support for it. On July 28, 1868, Secretary of State William Seward issued
the proclamation recognizing that the 14th Amendment had been ratified.5
The work of interpreting the Amendment began as soon as the 39th Congress
began framing it. The senators and representatives were well aware of the importance of their work. The framers crafted the Amendment to achieve the critical
goals of securing immediate and long-term peace and Union. The succeeding Congresses took seriously their role to effectuate the Amendment. In response to the
abuses of rights being practiced in the former slave states, those Congresses passed
a significant number of measures to make rights real and provide protection for
their exercise.6 Federal prosecutors and judges between 1866 and 1876 interpreted
and applied the Congressional statutes consistently with their understanding of
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the Amendment. Their enforcement had a positive impact on conditions in the
South, an impact that collapsed after the Supreme Court intervened.7
The Supreme Court’s first occasion to interpret the Amendment came in
1873. Although cognizant of the consequences its interpretation would have on
the future of the nation,8 the Court, unfortunately, seemed to be overwhelmed
by the potential breadth of the Amendment. Into the early twentieth century,
the Court acted repeatedly to limit the Amendment’s scope, opining that “we do
not see in those amendments any purpose to destroy the main features of the
general system.”9 The early Court decisions derailed the propulsive force of the
Amendment for legal change, and the Amendment remained nearly impotent
for seventy years.
Even as the Court limited the scope of the Amendment and of Congress’s
power pursuant to it during the 1870s and 1880s, the people engaged in interpreting the Amendment’s guarantees through their own civic and political
actions. The rebirth of the Amendment’s legal force is a testament to the power
of the ideals embodied in the Amendment and embraced as a key part of the
national consciousness.
Interpretation matters. This collection of work elucidates the interpretations
of those who created the 14th Amendment, as well as those charged with applying it initially. Those first interpretations are significant because they influenced
later interpretations. As both Garrett Epps and Richard Aynes point out, despite
the many competing theories of how to interpret the Constitution, none reject
the relevance of the history of the framing of that constitutional provision or
the likely meaning it held to the framers or others at the time of framing. As
Wilson Huhn notes, no theory rejects the use of Supreme Court precedent in
interpretation.
Interpretation differs from intent. Interpretation is a public process of
giving and explaining meaning, of representing meaning by actions taken pursuant to events and words. Interpretation is directed toward others. Interpretation translates and applies principle; it fleshes out the principle in action. Interpretation is capable of being collective, more forward-looking and external. To
determine interpretation, we examine text, contemporaneous action pursuant
to text, and the political and historical background of text and action.
Intent, conversely, is an internal process of “directing the mind,” the “state
of one’s mind at the time one carries out an action.” Discerning “intent” is an
attempt to parse the motives and understandings of individual participants.
Intent, therefore, is limited to the understanding of the drafters (assuming one
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can divine it), which is inevitably located in a single context, including the inability to foresee the various futures the text is designed to address. The synonym
for interpret is explain and for intend is mean. Explicating interpretation is an
objective inquiry, whereas revealing intention is a subjective inquiry.10
Interpretation is a public act of witness and requires full context. This book
is dedicated to enriching the historical context within which we examine the 14th
Amendment, an historical context that is intrinsically fascinating.
The context within which the Amendment was drafted reveals how the
framers interpreted their own history and times and incorporated their understanding into the language and structure of the Amendment. Garrett Epps
details the fear and suspicion that surrounded the Republican framers as they
sought to behead the hydra of the Slave Power “conspiracy” by reshaping the
Constitution at its most fundamental levels. Paul Finkelman investigates the
nascent progressive movements toward racial equality in the North that formed
the political milieu that influenced the key framers of the Amendment. He also
recounts the horrendous practices in the South that the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction responded to in framing the Amendment and legislation pursuant to it. Richard Aynes leads us into the halls and chambers of the 39th Congress, revealing the framers themselves; their aspirations both to secure a peace
to end the ongoing unrest and also to fashion a Union where specific rights
would guarantee future peace; and their resolve in the face of serious obstacles
during the drafting process.
Equally compelling are the stories of the Amendment’s first interpreters
after ratification. Michael Ross transports us to the streets of New Orleans,
where the public health legislation to restrict butchers to using a slaughterhouse
located away from the city and below its water supplies spawned the first interpretive challenge to reach the United States Supreme Court. He reveals the
underlying tensions among the butchers, the city and the lawyers in the case, as
well as the influences on Justice Miller, whose interest in protecting the public
health led to his majority opinion which supported local reconstruction legislative initiatives by limiting the impact of the Amendment. Ellen Connally
recounts the prosecution of Jefferson Davis, the president of the Confederate
States. She explains the inherent dangers in trying Davis for treason, and the
creativity of the lawyers and judges who sought to preserve the fragile peace
without either vindicating secession or claiming victory by making Davis a
martyr. The interpretations of these judges and lawyers were heavily influenced
by the political realities they confronted, both as individuals and on behalf of a
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nation struggling to understand the permanency of “union” and the meaning
of the cataclysmic bloodshed of the Civil War. Gwen Jordan documents how
Myra Bradwell and the women’s movement claimed that the equal protection
guarantee of the Amendment applied to women. She shows how Bradwell
carried that struggle to the courts, creating not only arguments about the reach
of equal protection but also an entire interpretive method that continues to
influence the application of the 14th Amendment. James Fox points out the
importance of the African American conventions, which infused vitality into
the concept of national citizenship. He explains how the newly created and recognized Black citizens emphasized the primacy of suffrage for defining citizenship and helped shape the meaning of civil and political rights.
Supreme Court interpretation profoundly affects constitutional meaning.
Supreme Court precedents often control the impact that constitutional guarantees have on the people, leading some to argue that the high court’s interpretation carries too much weight. My contribution details the importance of preCivil War Supreme Court precedents and the impact of those precedents and
their ideological basis on the framers of the Amendment. It also illuminates the
framers’ purpose to increase congressional power. David Bogen reanalyzes the
Court’s initial interpretation in Slaughter-House Cases, arguing that later Court
decisions misread that precedent. He contends that a more accurate reading of
the decision opens up possibilities for expanding the Amendment’s reach.
William Rich argues that the 39th Congress interpreted “privileges or immunities” as encompassing rights created by congressional legislation, and demonstrates that his interpretation is not inconsistent with early Court interpretations. Wilson Huhn carefully parses the first three Supreme Court interpretations
of the Amendment and the effect of those rulings at the time they were made.
He shows how those decisions became the starting point for further interpretation, eclipsing the starkly contrasting interpretations of the framers and their
direct congressional descendants.
Interpretation of the meaning of the Amendment, especially in the Supreme
Court, has often started with these early 14th Amendment decisions. Sometimes,
the Court has relied on precedents and constitutional provisions that predate
the 14th Amendment to constrict its meaning. The modern tendency to treat
the Court as both the “first” and the final interpreter ignores the primacy of the
framers as interpreters and reads the framers’ interpretations only through the
narrow lens of subsequent Court interpretations. This Supreme Court-centric
focus overlooks the value and impact of those who first breathed life into the
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guarantees of the Amendment—succeeding Congresses, federal prosecutors
and judges, and participants in powerful social movements inspired by the
promises of the Amendment.
This book contributes to the explosion of work that illuminates the early
history of the adoption and use of the 14th Amendment by telling the stories of
its very earliest interpreters. The contributors make no sweeping claims as to the
precise role that the first interpretations should play in the modern interpretive
enterprise. However, each chapter explores one or more of the first interpreters
within their historical and ideological context to produce a more accurate and
accessible understanding of their interpretations of the Amendment. The importance of historically accurate understandings as a guide to applying the Amendment was foreshadowed by counsel for the butchers in Slaughter-House Cases:
The comprehensiveness of this amendment, the natural and necessary breadth
of the language, the history of some of the clauses; their connection with discussions, contests, and domestic commotions that form landmarks in the
annals of constitutional government; the circumstances under which it became
part of the Constitution, demonstrate that the weighty import of what it
ordains is not to be misunderstood.11

Part I of the book examines how the 39th Congress interpreted its own work.
First, that Congress had to interpret the past and present events that led to the
necessity for the Amendment. What problems in the original constitutional
framework needed to be addressed? What solution would uproot those problems and prevent them from recurring? Second, the framers had to interpret the
structure and language of the proposed Amendment. Were both adequate, comprehensive and clear enough to accomplish their goals?
The framers were both interpreters of what they wanted and needed to say
and interpreters of what they had said in the Amendment. They shared a welldeveloped political ideology of the constitutional inadequacies that had led to the
Civil War and needed to be eradicated. As the framers drafted and adopted the
Amendment, they interpreted their present circumstances in order to address
them effectively. After ratification, the framers enacted legislation to implement
the Amendment, giving early and nearly contemporaneous interpretations of the
Amendment’s ability to address new and continuing inequities.
Parts II and III examine how the early interpretations of others, including the
Supreme Court and the polity, affected the reach and power of the Amendment.
Part II closely examines the infamous Slaughter-House Cases, the Court’s
initial interpretation of the Amendment. The Court interpreted Section 1 of the
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Amendment narrowly with the avowed purpose of preserving the existing
framework of government. This work’s contributors disagree about the extent
to which the Court intended to eviscerate the Amendment’s meaning; later Court
decisions and legislation used alternative paths including the Due Process and
Commerce Clauses, respectively, to reinstate virtually all of the rights or powers
withheld by the earliest Court interpretations. The authors note that the early
Supreme Court decisions blocked some interpretive paths but either opened
another interpretive trail or, at the very least, left openings later used to reinvigorate the promises of the Amendment and achieve its framers’ goals.
Part III looks directly at how the public response to the Amendment shaped
its meaning. The contributors investigate how public movements kept alive the
Amendment’s potential to revise the fabric of American life and law. For instance,
lawyers and judges interpreted Section 3 of the Amendment to achieve overriding
goals like maintaining peace, stability and reconciliation while protecting the constitutional theory of Union that prevailed with the North’s victory in the Civil War.
Even though the Supreme Court ignored the Equal Protection Clause when upholding Illinois’ refusal to admit Myra Bradwell to the practice of law, Bradwell and the
women’s movement continued to invoke the Amendment and equal protection
to further civil rights. Bradwell’s interpretive strategies still affect the concept of
equal protection as used today. The black conventions illustrate the importance
of political participation in defining constitutional meaning. This movement
enabled the freedpeople to participate in the political life of the country and use
their personal experiences to define citizenship and infuse meaning into the broad
guarantees of Section 1 of the Amendment. These social movements wove the
Amendment’s promises into the public consciousness, keeping its ideals alive
despite the initial Supreme Court rulings and the end of Reconstruction.
The story of the 14th Amendment is one in which the infinite hopes of its
framers became finite and bitter, disappointments in the hands of the Court.
Yet, the spirit of hope in the Amendment survived. Ultimately the fate of hopes
for liberty and equality rests, and always has rested, with people who make the
Constitution a force in their lives.
I would like to thank Richard Aynes, Wilson Huhn, and Sarah Cravens for their comments and
assistance on earlier drafts, and Ellen Lander and Christy Wesig for their editorial assistance. If
any historical or other errors appear, they are solely my responsibility.
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The Antebellum Political
Background of the 14th
Amendment
Garrett Epps, University of Baltimore School of Law

F

or the viability of a progressive American constitutionalism, no question
of meaning is more important than that of the 14th Amendment. Much
of American constitutional law, at least that part of it that concerns individual rights, consists of a series of footnotes to the 14th Amendment.1
The Amendment was the work of a particular group of practical politicians,
the Republican congressional majority in the 39th Congress, a group concerned
with their own political futures, the future of their party, and the rights and desires
of their constituents, as well as the future course of American society.
The 39th Congress that framed the 14th Amendment was not a “Reconstruction Congress,” but one overwhelmingly shaped by the practical concerns of the
Civil War. The 39th Congress, which opened its deliberations in December 1865
and the draft Amendment in June 1866, had been elected in late 1864 as part of
the same wartime election cycle that reelected President Abraham Lincoln.
Though the framers of the 14th Amendment had reacted to specific events in the
South after the surrender at Appomattox, their sense of the issues facing the
nation was that of the Northern Republican leadership that fought the war.
Specifically, the framers were operating on the assumption that the cause
of the Civil War was neither the institution of slavery itself, nor Northern moral
disapproval of it, but a complex political institution called the “Slave Power”—
a political term that referred not only to Southern whites who owned slaves but

11
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The Antebellum Political Background of the 14th Amendment

to constitutional provisions and political practices that gave them disproportionate power in the federal government. As antebellum free-soil and antislavery
politicians saw it, the complexity of the Slave Power meant that the war’s aims
could not be realized by merely freeing the slaves and guaranteeing their freedom
in the 13th Amendment. Because the chief threats of the Slave Power lay in its
negative effect on national politics and the rights of white citizens outside the
South, eliminating it would require far-reaching changes in the state–federal
balance, the federal separation of powers, and the internal political systems of
the individual Southern states.
My contention is that if, in 1856, an antislavery politician had been asked to
propose a constitutional amendment to eliminate the dangerous influence of
the Slave Power, an amendment very much like the 14th Amendment would have
been produced. In this regard, I argue that we should pay close attention to the
antebellum political arguments forged by the men who later framed the 14th
Amendment. Their ideas are essential to understanding the interpretation given
by them to the words and structure of the Amendment they adopted.
In relating the final Amendment to antebellum politics, I do not wish to
slight the influence on Northern public opinion of the Civil War itself or of the
events of 1865, but I do suggest that it is extremely useful to note that the Republican response to the events of 1861–1865 flowed out of prewar political thought.
In that configuration of antislavery ideas, the idea of the Slave Power deserves
a more prominent place than most legal and constitutional thinkers (though not
necessarily most professional historians of the period) have heretofore given it.2
In fact, I suggest that we grant the theory of the Slave Power the same kind of
attention paid to the intellectual background of the framing of the Constitution.
The framers of the 14th Amendment were shaped by a background of political
history and theory quite different from the eighteenth-century history and philosophy that informed the work of framing in 1787.
The five-section Amendment is by far the longest ever adopted through the
amendment process. Much scholarship and caselaw refers to the far-reaching
effects on individual rights that resulted from the Citizenship Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection
Clause. In addition, there is power bestowed upon Congress by Section 5 to interfere with state laws that violate the previous four sections. The middle three sections imposed unprecedented (if now obsolete) federal limitations on state voting
laws, qualifications for state offices, and debt-repayment schemes. Section 3 also
changed the separation of powers created by the original Constitution, transfer-
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ring from the President to Congress the power to grant “reprieves and pardons
for offenses against the United States” to officials who have engaged in “insurrection or rebellion” or have given “aid and comfort” to the nation’s enemies.3
The changes the 14th Amendment wrought in our system were profound,
with implications not only for the substance and procedure of state government,
but also for the relationship between states and the federal government and
among the branches of the national government. In many ways, the totality of
the 14th Amendment has shaped American democracy to this day.
Much of the interpretive work on the 14th Amendment has occurred in the
courts and, while the reach of the Amendment is quite expansive, its judicial
interpretation has often relied on a decidedly crabbed vision of its meaning.
American judges maintain an odd dual consciousness about the 14th Amendment. On the one hand, they admit, over and over, that the 14th Amendment
changed many details of our legal system. On the other hand, they seem unaware
that the number of details, and the direction of the changes they represent,
amount to something more than a series of isolated, almost idiosyncratic, results
of the amendment process. Even in important decisions construing the 14th
Amendment, judges often seem to regard it as a minor editing change to the
Founders’ Constitution—interpreting it first and foremost through an assumption that it was not designed to change the structure and workings of the 1787
document.4
For instance, in the first major decision interpreting the 14th Amendment,
the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Miller explained that it was necessary to interpret the Amendment extremely narrowly, because otherwise it might be held to
have changed the Constitution:
The argument we admit is not always the most conclusive which is drawn from
the consequences urged against the adoption of a particular construction of
an instrument. But when, as in the case before us, these consequences are so
serious, so far-reaching and pervading, so great a departure from the structure
and spirit of our institutions; when the effect is to fetter and degrade the State
governments by subjecting them to the control of Congress, in the exercise of
powers heretofore universally conceded to them of the most ordinary and
fundamental character; when in fact it radically changes the whole theory of
the relations of the State and Federal governments to each other and of both
these governments to the people; the argument has a force that is irresistible,
in the absence of language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit
of doubt.5
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The dismissive tone of the Slaughter-House majority reappears over and over
in the United States Reports, the official record of the U.S. Supreme Court, and
the current Supreme Court is committed to it. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the
Court insisted that Congress lacks the power to set a broad prophylactic rule
enforcing the congressional vision of the Free Exercise Clause of the 1st Amendment because the language of Section 5, which appears to empower Congress,
is limited by an unwritten requirement that congressional enforcement legislation be “congruen[t] and proportional” to the constitutional violations Congress
seeks to remedy. Perhaps, the Court does not realize that the framers of the 14th
Amendment may not have reposed the same implicit trust in the wisdom of
federal judges that the current justices do.6
The tone of denial is succinctly captured by Chief Justice Rehnquist in an
opinion explaining that the 14th Amendment’s Section 5, Enforcement Clause
could never be construed to allow Congress to supplement state tort law with a
federal tort cause of action against perpetrators of gender-based violence:
[T]he language and purpose of the 14th Amendment place certain limitations
on the manner in which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct. These
limitations are necessary to prevent the 14th Amendment from obliterating
the Framers’ carefully crafted balance of power between the States and the
National Government.7

I maintain that the odd tone and almost certainly wrong interpretation of
these opinions arises from an impoverished historical understanding of the 14th
Amendment. Some misunderstandings arise from the reticent tone of the legislative debates leading up to the Amendment.8 However, some confusion also
arises because contemporary interpreters read those legislative debates without
a rich sense of the historical background against which the framers of the 14th
Amendment based the change they were making to the Constitution.
The Slave Power background of the Amendment gives grounds to argue for
a broad interpretation of its terms, one embracing the radicalism of some of its
authors, reflected in the dissent in Slaughter-House by Justice Swayne:
These amendments are a new departure, and mark an important epoch in the
constitutional history of the country. They trench directly upon the power of
the States, and deeply affect those bodies. They are, in this respect, at the opposite pole from the first eleven. Fairly construed these amendments may be said
to rise to the dignity of a new Magna Charta.9
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In order to put the Amendment into proper context, I will summarize the
meaning of the term “Slave Power” as used by the practical politicians who built
the Republican Party, brought it to power, and won the war against the South. I
go on to demonstrate the ways in which antislavery politicians saw the strength
of the Slave Power as flowing directly from flaws in the original Constitution of
1787, and the ways in which the antebellum political system strengthened the
slaveowning interests of the South both within Southern politics and in the
counsels of the nation. I then discuss the original Republican program for
ending Slave Power influence before Southern secession and show its relevance
to the political situation faced by the Republican members of the 39th Congress,
who would eventually pass the Amendment. In the conclusion, I argue that
reading the 14th Amendment against the political background of the Slave
Power concept suggests that the somnambulists on the federal bench have
misread the Amendment, both in its aim and in its scope.

i. analysis
A. The “Slave Power”—Conspiracy and Historiography
The Slave Power was a term coined by abolitionists in the 1830s, but it was
not taken up and widely used by mainstream politicians until the 1850s. It had
two related but not identical meanings. The first referred to a conspiracy of
slaveholders and “dough-faced” Northern politicians (Northerners who sought
office and influence by cultivating Southern support) to preserve and extend the
prerogatives of slaveholders.10 The second (discussed below) referred to the
political advantages conferred on slave states by the Constitution and the antebellum political system.
In the conspiratorial sense, the Slave Power fits with other conspiracy theories of the antebellum era—the fears of Freemasonry and Catholicism that
spawned the Anti-Masonic and American (or “Know-Nothing”) Parties, respectively, for example. Throughout the period, and throughout history, Americans
have shown credulity toward allegations that a secretive, alien, and undemocratic group or elite was conspiring to subvert the promise of American liberty.11
That it seems implausible today does not mean that it was not sincerely believed
at the time. For example, no less a figure than Abraham Lincoln accused Stephen
A. Douglas of taking part in a conscious conspiracy to nationalize slavery, a conspiracy in which the other participants were Presidents Pierce and Buchanan
and Chief Justice Taney. As Lincoln summarized his thoughts in a draft speech
for the 1858 senatorial election against Douglas:
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